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As is evident fromDan Burks’ excellent paper1 and critique, the SupremeCourt’s deci-
sions inMayo,Myriad and Alice and the CAFC’s in Roslin2 focused widespread atten-
tion on the formulation of patent-eligibility exclusions for specific biological material
and diagnostic methods.
The debate recently intensified with the CAFC’s Sequenom decision and denial of a
rehearing en banc.3 The claims at issue in U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 (‘US ’540 patent’)
are directed tomethods of genetic testing by detecting and amplifying paternally inher-
ited fetal cell-free DNA from maternal blood and plasma.4 Before the development of
† Professor of Biotechnology Law, Jur. Dr., LL.M, M.I.C.L., Centre for Information & Innovation Law (CIIR),
University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
‡ Attorney at Law, New York, US; LLM European Business Law, Researcher, Faculty of Law, Lund University,
Sweden.
1 Dan L. Burk,Dolly and Alice, J. L. BIOSCI. 2, 606–626 (2015) DOI:10.1093/jlb/lsv042.
2 SeeMayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321
(2012) (‘Mayo’); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. U.S.. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 186
L.Ed.2d124 (2013) (‘Myriad’); andAliceCorporationPtyLtd v.CLSBank InternationalU.S., 134S.Ct. 2347,
189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014) (‘Alice’), In re Roslin Institute 750 F.3d 133 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (‘Roslin’).
3 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 788 F.3d 1377 (Fed Cir. 2015) (‘Sequenom’) and Ariosa Diagnos-
tics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 802 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed Cir. 2015) (‘December 12 Order’) (Per curiamOrder
Denying petition for rehearing en banc.); petition for cert. filed, sub nom. Sequenom, Inc., v. Ariosa Diagnos-
tics, Inc. 2016WL 1105544 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2016) (No. 15–1182.).
4 See claim 1 of the US ‘540 patent U.S: Amethod for detecting a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin
performedon amaternal serumor plasma sample fromapregnant female, whichmethod comprises amplifying
a paternally inherited nucleic acid from the serum or plasma sample and detecting the presence of a paternally
inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin in the sample.
C© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law,
Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distri-
bution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that
the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
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2  Separating sheep from goats: a European view
this non-invasive prenatal diagnostic test, patients were placed at higher risk and ma-
ternal plasma was routinely discarded as waste.
A reluctant CAFC formulaically interpreted the Supreme Court-devised bifurcated
test5 to identify patent ineligible subject matter and invalidated the patent for this
ground-breaking method. Notably, Judge Linn wrote that this innovation deserves
patent protection, but that the ‘sweeping language of the test’ established in Mayo re-
quires a determination that the claims are patent ineligible.6 On March 21, 2016, Se-
quenom Inc. filed for certiorari7 and the issue may once again find itself at the Supreme
Court. As framed by Sequenom, the question presented is:
Whether a novel method is patent-eligible where: (1) a researcher is the first to discover
a natural phenomenon; (2) that unique knowledge motivates him to apply a new combi-
nation of known techniques to that discovery; and (3) he thereby achieves a previously
impossible result without preempting other uses of the discovery?
Interestingly, in Europe the EPO upheld essentially the same claims.8 European
equivalents of thepatents considered inMyriad,Mayo,Alice andRoslinwere also treated
differently than in the USA.9 Hence, these cases undermine the global integration of
patent standards and provide fodder for discussing patentability requirements at an in-
ternational level.
Referring to these developments, our brief comment complements Burk’s paper by
discussing these issues from a comparative European perspective. Section 1 provides a
very brief summary of the European patent framework and case law regarding medical
diagnostic methods. Leaving aside national peculiarities that would exceed the limi-
tations of this short paper, we focus on the EPO’s patent eligibility approach vis-a`-vis
medical diagnostic methods similar to those in Sequenom v. Ariosa. Section 2 discusses
our findings and the differences between the USA and European approaches from a
broader innovation and patent policy perspective providing the basis for concluding
remarks in Section 3.
1. EXCLUSIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO PATENTABILITY
IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT
Apart from international patent treaties, such as the TRIPS agreement10 and
the PCT11, patent law in Europe is primarily governed by three European legal
5 Alice 134 S.Ct. at 2355 set out this test as first identifyingwhether the claimswere ‘directed’ to patent ineligible
subject matter and, if so asking ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’ Adding to the confusion, Alice
describes step two as a ‘search for “an inventive concept”’ to ensure that the patent is ‘significantly more’ than
a patent on the ineligible subject matter. Id.
6 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn Concurring.)
7 2016WL 1105544 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2016) ∗1.U.S. S. Ct.- Case No. 15-1182.
8 Case T-146/07 of Dec. 13, 2011 (Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis/ISIS INNOVATION LTD).
9 Cases T-1213/05 (Breast and ovarian cancer/UNIVERSITY OF UTAH) of Sept. 27, 2007;T-666/05 (Mu-
tation/UNIVERSITY OF UTAH) of Nov. 13, 2008;T-80/05 (Method of diagnosis/UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH) of Nov. 19, 2008; T-156/08 (BRCA2/ UNIVERSITY OF UTAH) of Jan. 14, 2011; EP 849990 B1
2001 and EP847237 B1 2008 (PCT/GB96/02099 and PCT/GB96/02098) (Roslin Institute (Edinburgh).
10 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Annex 1C of theMarrakesh Agreement
establishing theWorld Trade Organization, signed inMarrakesh, Morocco on Apr. 15, 1994, (‘TRIPS’) 1869
UNTS 299. Cf Article 27 (1) TRIPS.
11 Patent Cooperation Treaty, Done at Washington, June 19, 1970, in force Jan. 24, 1978, as amended, (‘PCT’)
28 UST 7645.
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sources.12 The European Union (‘EU’) promotes the internal harmonization of sub-
stantial and procedural patent law, prosecution, and litigation, most notably through
the emerging European unitary patent and litigation system set out in the rules of the
so-called European patent package and the draft rules of procedure. In addition, the
Biotech Directive13, which was incorporated into the implementing regulations14, sig-
nificantly affects theway biotech inventions at theEPOare assessed (although theEPO
is not formally bound by EU law).
Article 52(1) EPC provides that European patents shall be granted for any inven-
tions, in all fields of technology, provided, that they are new, involve an inventive step,
and are susceptible of industrial application. Most importantly, patents must display a
‘technical invention’ as confirmed by the implementing regulations to the EPC, which
emphasize that the invention must have technical features (Rule 43(1)), which relate
to a technical field (Rule 42(1)(a)) and are concerned with a technical problem (Rule
42(1)(c)).
In contrast to the USA, case law-based patent law exclusions, patent claim ineli-
gibility under the EPC is codified in the form of ‘exclusions’ and ‘exceptions’. EPC
Article 52(2) explicitly codifies exclusions, at least if they are claimed ‘as such’. Arti-
cle 52 (2) excludes claims that are abstract in nature (discoveries) or non-technical in
nature (scientific theories or methods for performing mental acts). These are consid-
ered ‘non-inventions’ ‘whose common feature is a substantial lack of technical char-
acter’.15 The test for whether or not a claimed invention claims excluded matter ‘as
such’ first looks to the technical features claimed.16 In Opinion G 3/08, a case having
much in common withDiamond v. Diehr17, the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeals rea-
soned that it was vital, especially in new fields of technology, to carefully examine all of
the claims to determine the dividing line between excluded and permissible matters.18
12 These are the Convention on the grant of European Patents Done at Munich Oct.5, 1973, in force Oct. 7,
1978, 1065 UNTS 199, as revised by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of Dec. 17, 1991 and the Act revising
the EPC of Nov. 29, 2000 (‘EPC’). See also OF 4/2007 Revision of the European Patent Convention (EPC
2000);The EU ‘patent package’ consisting of the UPCAOJ 2013 C 175/1; Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012
OJ 2012 L 361/; and Council Regulation (EU)No. 1260/2012OJ 2012 L 361/89; and the Preliminary set of
provisions for the Rules of Procedure (‘Rules’) of the Unified Patent Court, 18th draft of July 1, 2015; see also
Implementing Regulations to the EPC of Oct. 5, 1973 as amended (‘IR’).
13 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 6,1998 on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213 (‘Biotech Directive’ or ‘Directive 98/44’).
14 Decision of the Administrative Council [of the EPO] of June 16, 1999 OJ EPO 1999, p. 437-440 and 573 ff.
15 OpinionG 02/13 ofMar. 25, 2015 (Tomato II/Brocolli II) (‘OpinionG 02/13’) VII Application of the Rules
of Interpretation 2. (3) (a).The case concerned a Product by Process which Burke points out is implicated in
Roslin.
16 Opinion G 2/88 of Dec. 11, 1989 (Friction reducing additive/MOBIL OIL III) (‘Opinion G 2/88’) Reasons
at 8.
17 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–190 (1981) (‘Diamond v. Diehr’.): In determining the eligibility of
respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.
It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old
elements in the analysis. . . .The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of
no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter.
18 OpinionG-3/08 ofMay 12, 2010 (computer-implemented inventions, CIIs), OJ EPO2011, 10, reasons point
13 ff., see also note 24 in the Reasons for the Decision Point 7.3.4. (‘Where jurisprudence enters new legal
territory, caution is required to avoid making statements that will prove untenable in the very next case to
arise’.)
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Accordingly, excludedmatter is nothivedoff frompermissiblematter in considering the
claims since ‘features which would, taken in isolation, belong to the matters excluded
from patentability by Article 52(2) EPC may nonetheless contribute to the technical
character of a claimed invention, and therefore cannot be discarded in the consider-
ation of the inventive step’.19 Opinion G 2/88 further demonstrates that the EPO has
long recognized that when an idea or concept underlying the claimed subjectmatter re-
sides in a discovery, it does not necessarily mean the claimed subject matter is a discov-
ery as such.20 Consequently, the current November 2015 EPOGuidelines distinguish
a mere discovery from a practical application of that discovery as follows:
If a new property of a known material or article is found out, that is mere discovery and
unpatentable because discovery as such has no technical effect and is therefore not an
invention within the meaning of Art. 52(1). If, however, that property is put to practical
use, then this constitutes an invention which may be patentable. [...].21
In addition to Article 52 (2) EPC, Article 53 EPC sets forth five main groups of in-
ventions for which no patent may be granted (‘exceptions’) but ‘does not envisage a
system of general exceptions to patentability that per se would allow or even necessi-
tate a broad interpretation of any of the exclusions’.22 EPC Article 53 (c) codifies the
‘exception’ of medical diagnostic methods and methods of treatment practiced on the
human body.
InOpinionG 1/04 ‘Diagnosticmethods’, the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal held
that ‘Diagnostic methods practiced on the human body’ encompass the following con-
secutive steps: (1) an examination phase involving the collection of data, (2) compari-
son of the results with standard values, (3) identifying any significant deviance, that is, a
symptom, during the comparison, and (4) the attribution of the deviance to a particular
clinical picture, that is, the deductive medical or veterinary decision phase.23
The Enlarged Board’s organization of the reasoning into a four-part examination24
is significant in comparison with Mayo’s broader, less focused deductive approach.25
Additional statements from the Enlarged Board in Opinion G 1/04 are also signifi-
cant. First, ‘diagnosis’ with regard to the exception of diagnostic methods practiced on
the human body was defined as ‘the determination of the nature of a medicinal condi-
tion intended to identify a pathology’,26 and that to determine the scope of the exclu-
sion all of the steps must be considered.27 The Board also found that, for purposes of
19 Id. at point 12.2.2 of the reasons (referring to T 0208/84 (Computer-related invention) of 15.7.1986).
20 Opinion G 2/88, point 9.3.
21 Cf. Guidelines for Examinations in the EPO, November 2015 version, Part G - Chapter II-3.1, 1 http://
documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/A62ECC3718E570B3C1257EF100351F38/$File/
guidelines for examination part g en.pdf (accessed Mar. 19, 2016) (examples omitted); regarding biotech-
nological inventions see also G-II, 5, 5.3 to 5.5, and G-III, 4.
22 Opinion G 02/13 note 22, VII Application of the Rules of Interpretation 2. (3) (a).
23 Opinion G-1/04 of Dec. 16, 2005 (Diagnostic methods) (“Opinion G-1/04”.)
24 Id. Reasons for the Opinion point 5.
25 Cf. Opinion G-1/04 Reasons for the Opinion points 5-5.3 and, cf. Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1299 (The claim simply
tells doctors to measure the current level of the relevant metabolite, use particular laws of nature, calculate the
current toxicity/inefficacy limits, and reconsider the drug dosage in light of the law of nature.)
26 Id. Reasons for the Opinion, point 5.1.
27 Id. point 6.
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determining exemption from patentability, the diagnostic method has to comprise all
the steps mentioned above in points (1)–(4). Second, ‘practiced on the human body’
is a prerequisite, referring only to technical method steps, whereas the deductive deci-
sion phase itself is a non-technical, merely intellectual exercise.28 The Board added the
caveat that claims solely directed to a deductive decision phase are excluded pursuant
to Article 52(2) EPC as concerning only mental acts.29 All of these steps must be ex-
amined together due to the multistep nature of medical diagnosis.30 Thus, to be patent
eligible such methods must encompass preceding technical steps not practiced on the
human body.Third, the Board clarified the status of diagnosticmethods where some or
all steps concern in vitro techniques in a laboratory not directly practiced on the human
body. This includes genetic diagnostic methods, such the use of DNA microarrays or
DNA sequencing. The Board considered such steps to be of a purely technical nature
concluding that genetic diagnostic methods claiming these technical steps are, in prin-
ciple, not excluded by Article 53 (c). Significantly, the Board held that method steps of
‘obtaining results or findings’ do not provide a sufficient basis for denying patentability
under Article 53(c) EPC.31
Against this background, it is particularly interesting to see how the EPO dealt with
the European counterpart of Sequenom’s ‘US ’540 patent’32, ie. European patent EP
994 963 (‘EP ’963’). Sequenom’s EP ’963 was examined and granted by the EPO and
covered claims that are substantially identical toUSclaim1of the ’540patent33. EP ’963
subsequently prevailed in a third-party opposition procedure, and evenwithstood even
an appeal to the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal.34 Interestingly, these proceedings
did not dealwith subject-matter eligibility, which—unlike theCAFC—appears to have
been tacitly acknowledged by the EPO. Instead the EPO focused on determining if the
method claimed were novel and inventive.35
To sum up, while patents directed to the isolated BRCA genes, related diagnostic
methods, and claims similar to the claims at issue in Sequenom remain highly controver-
sial in Europe, both legislation and case law regard them as patent eligible under EPC
Articles 52 and 53.36 The CAFC’s exceptionally restrictive interpretation of theMayo
andMyriadmandated ‘significantlymore’ criteria in Sequenom do not exist in that form
in European patent law and practice.
28 Id. point 5.2.
29 Id. point 6 (referring back to point 5.2.)
30 Id. point 6.2.2.
31 Id. point 6.2.3.
32 Cf. supra note 2.
33 Cf. claims 1 and 4 of European patent EP 994 963: A detection method performed on a maternal serum or
plasma sample from a pregnant female, which method comprises detecting the presence of a nucleic acid of
foetal origin in the sample, wherein said nucleic acid is a paternally inherited sequence which is not possessed
by said pregnant female. [. . . ]4. Amethod according to [claim 1], wherein said detecting comprises amplifying
said nucleic acid.
34 See Case No. T 0146/07 - 3.3.08 (Prenatal diagnosis/ISIS) of 13.12.2011.
35 Id.
36 Cf. Robert M. Schwartz & Timo Minssen, Life after Myriad: The Uncertain Future of Patenting Biomedical In-
novation and Personalised Medicine in an International Context, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 189 (2015)(adding that
European legislation and case law appears to bemore restrictive with regard to the scope of protection granted
to patents utilizing isolated (human)DNA sequences. But this is not addressed in the framework of the patent
eligibility standard).
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2. DISCUSSION
Differences in patent law may be expected worldwide, but divergent approaches to ge-
netic product and process patent eligibility institutionalize deep-seated differences in
the approaches of different courts to new technologies, especially in the life sciences.Se-
quenom’s disjunctive eligibility test deviates from the integrated approach of Diamond
v. Diehr,37 mirrored in the integrative European approach to patent ineligible subject
matter. Diamond v. Diehr does not necessarily conflict with the holdings of theMayo,
Myriad, Alice trilogy.38 However, as Judge Linn’s Sequenom concurrence demonstrates,
the CAFC believed that Mayo impliedly modified Diamond v. Diehr to eliminate all
‘conventional activity’ from the claims analysis.39 He interpreted this as requiring the
excisionof any post solution activity thatwas purely obvious or conventional.40 Such an
interpretation threatens to rewrite the patent laws by combining the ‘new and useful’ of
§ 101 with the ‘novelty’ of § 102.41 While it is unlikely that the US Supreme Court will
revise the gravamen of its three recent decisions regarding patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, it may clarify the eligibility test they establish.
Although it appears as if both the European and the US eligibility standards share
the common goals of excluding ‘mere’ discoveries from patentability, the contradic-
tory US and European applications of patent eligibility standards expose fundamental
discrepancies in the US’s analytical approach. Sequenom’s §101 test conflicts with the
holistic, harmonized European approach to excepted or excluded subject matter. Its
atomistic approach to claims eligibility threatens an over 20-year-oldUSpolicy encour-
aging global convergence of patent standards. As applied, it may violate international
treaties to which the USA is a party.42 These provisions include Rules 39.1 and 67.1 of
the PCT and arguably Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement which were patterned on the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.43
Aside from disrupting and conflating traditional patent law doctrines, Sequenom’s
interpretation adds to the controversy over the future role of the patent system in en-
hancing biomedical innovation vis-a`-vis complementary forms of protection, such as
regulatory exclusivities and trade secrets.44 We recognize that patents may not always
be the most appropriate tool to enhance innovation and access to therapies in some
specific areas of medical innovation. However, we believe that future innovation re-
quires an efficient and more open collaboration among various stakeholders including
governments, public authorities, patients, and the industry. Due to the disclosure re-
quirement and its value for technology transfer, patents play an important role in such
37 See supra note 13.
38 Diamond v. Diehr was approvingly quoted (450 U.S. at 188) by Alice 134 S. Ct. at 2355 n. 3.
39 Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1380 (Linn concurring).
40 Id. J. Linn was not alone, as one of the judges concurring in Sequenom and three judges (including Linn) con-
curring in the December 12 Order, believed that they were left with no discretion despite concerns over the
test’s detrimental effect on life science innovation., cf. J. Lourie and Moore’s concurrences, supra note 3, 802
F.3d at 1286.
41 Cf. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188, 190 (holding that it is inappropriate, especially in the context of ‘pro-
cesses’, to consider old and new elements in isolation because it would import ‘novelty’, from §102 into §101).
42 See U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.
43 Cf. DecisionG-1/07 of Feb. 15, 2010 (Treatment by surgery-MEDI-PHYSICS) VIIIThe comments made by
the President of the EPO, 4. International patent law and practice. (Pointing out that EPC (1973) Article 52
(4) was based on PCT Rules 39.1 and 67.1 and Article 27.3 (a) of TRIPS.)
44 Cf. Arti K. Rai & Jacob S. Sherkow,TheChanging Life Science Patent Landscape, 34 NAT. BIOTECH. 292 (2016).
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collaborations45, whereas trade secret protection might result in unwanted informa-
tion bottlenecks and regulatory exclusivities are not adequately available for diagnos-
tics. Without appropriate complementary forms of protection or alternative incentives
in place, and considering the broader spill-over impact of the CAFC’s interpretation,
we believe that these developments will not only be detrimental to innovative medical
diagnostics, but also harm the development of other (medical) technologies and hence
patientsworldwide.46 Amoredeveloped and instructive analytical framework is needed
to give more useful guidance to lower courts and to ultimately achieve reasonable re-
sults and legal certainty.
Significantdifferences in eligibility standards strain theoperationof andcooperation
among, the Trilateral Offices (USPTO, EPO, and the Japanese Patent Office, JPO) in-
ter alia increasing the cost and complexity of obtaining triadic patent family protection
in the life sciences.47 They raise costs by threatening economies of scale, create uncer-
tainty, and risk fragmenting the global delivery system for innovative medicinal prod-
ucts and diagnostics. They can also disrupt the existing balance among different forms
of IP protection sought by technology innovators.
We believe that amore holistic application of the SupremeCourt’s patent-eligibility
rationale would better support investment in biopharmaceutical innovation and the
development of innovative treatments and precision medicine towards market ap-
proval. Such approach would go a long way towards assuring that differences among
the world’s patent law systems do not create unnecessary compliance costs ultimately
borne by consumers of medical care.
Both in Europe and in theUSA, concerns have been raised about overly preemptive
patents scope, but these are addressed at different levels. In our view, and as pointed out
inDanBurk’s paper, the current approach conflates the patent eligibility testwith issues
that could be more sensibly addressed within a strict and coherent assessment of nov-
elty, non-obviousness, and sufficient disclosure criteria or on the post-grant level. To
transplant those issues into the patent eligibility, assessment might categorically close
thepatentability door tomanywell-defined andbeneficial inventions that otherwisede-
serve patent protection corresponding to the inventors actual contribution to the state
of the art.
If the CAFC’s restrictive interpretation should prevail, however, we believe that it
will be crucial to swiftly optimize the framework for regulatory exclusivities on an in-
ternational level to allow for greater flexibilities and encompass further technological
areas, such as biomedical diagnostics. Article 39 of the TRIPS agreement should pro-
vide sufficient leeway for such changes.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The argumentation framework established inMayo,Myriad and Alice as interpreted by
Sequenom stands in clear contrast to current European legislation and practice. Such
decisions can exert significant influence on European debates and patent practices.
45 See alsoDan L. Burke, Patents as Data Aggregators in PersonalizedMedicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. &TECH. 233 (2015.)
46 Cf. Rachel Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (2016). SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=2596875 (last accessed June 1, 2015).
47 Triadic patent families are a set of patents granted by the EPO, JPO, and theUSPTOwhich share one ormore
priorities. OECD Patent Statistics Manual (OECD Publishing 2009) Ch. 1 Glossary.
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Legal developments in patent law, while local in immediate effect, migrate within an
increasingly global economy and may destabilize the objective of harmonizing an effi-
cient world patent system. Disruption in one pathway easily spills over into others. It
is important to identify potential conflicts early and rectify them before positions be-
come path dependent and resistant to resolution. In innovative, not well-understood
technologies, courts tasked with supervising patent law should give clear signals that all
of themovingpartsmust be as carefully considered as possible.Too static legal interpre-
tations in high-tech patenting might dry up the wells supplying technological progress.
Sequenom provides an opportunity to clarify the patent eligibility tests enunciated in
the Court’s recent case law. The patent claims’ scope were forensically construed in a
Markman proceeding48 and have already been examined during anUSPTO inter partes
review.49 In addition, the patent includes not only relatively broad independent claims,
but also well-defined dependent claims directed to individual tests. While well-defined
method claims may also be found in Mayo, it remains unclear whether the Supreme
Court intended to import the policy considerations ofMayo into a product of nature
analysis. AlthoughSequenom’s claims are clearly process claims, they still involve prod-
ucts of nature.
We therefore urge a clarification of the US’s patent eligibility test more in line with
the Supreme Court’s longstanding jurisprudence, and in harmony with international
and European law to accomplish a more uniform culling of unpatentable goats from
patentable sheep.
48 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., v. Sequenom, Inc., 2013 WL 5701532 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013) (not reported in
F.Supp.2d.)
49 Another question is of course whether the USPTO could have better advised the applicant during those pro-
ceedings, and if the broader claims should have been granted in the first place.
 by guest on M
ay 5, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
